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URBAN GOVERNMENT FINANCE AND FEDERAL

INCOME TAX REFORM1**
ROY BAHL*

portant macroeconomic policies and
THE to to
solve solve
tax reformall
all ofof
of America's
America's
1986 is noteconomic
economic meant
structural changes in the economy that
problems. It is meant to simplify a will
terrishape the fiscal response by local
bly complex tax code and to removegovernments.
prefIn section II, the present
condition of cities is discussed. What is
erential treatments that make the system
unfair and bias investment choices in favor of subsidized activities. But the tax
code revision will have other effects be-

their financial and economic condition as

they enter this era of the new U.S. in-

come tax? We turn then to a discussion of

cause private investors, consumers and
the potential impact of the reform on the
fiscal condition of cities, and to an analgovernments have spent decades working
out their response to the incentives of the
ysis of their fiscal response. The final secpresent system and now must alter their
tion of the paper explores the implicabehavior. One important set of impactstions
of of this impact for changes in the
the tax reform likely will be to change nature
the
of the federal system.
role of state versus local governments in
our federal system, to heighten the fiscal
I. The Setting for Tax Reform
competition among state and local gov-

ernments, and to compromise the finan-If one imagines that the tax reform
might put a squeeze on state and local
cial situation of certain large cities. Since
government resources, then 1987 looks to
we are a country with neither a national

be a good time to squeeze. The economy
urban policy nor a national industrial

has grown since 1982, the inflation rate
policy, it is especially important that the
impacts of national economic policy is
ondown, defense spending is up, cities do

not appear to be facing fiscal crises, and

urban economies be aired.

state and local governments have shown
The potential impact of the tax code rea good ability to manage the fiscal convision on urban local governments is the

sequences of recession. Everyone would
subject of this paper. The word "potennot agree with this assessment. Some
tial" is important because the actual imwould argue that state and local governpact will depend on how producers, conments, and particularly cities, are not all

sumers and investors react to the new

in a position to deal with the conse-

income tax rules. Theory can tell us

something about the direction of the re- quences of tax reform. Especially the older
sponse - taxpayers who itemize will want cities of the North have experienced rel-

to pay lower taxes when their marginalatively slow economic growth, are more
fiscally strained, must serve a heavier
concentration of poor families and have
sea when it comes to estimating the mag-

tax rate falls - but we are much more at

been hurt most by the withdrawal of fednitude of the response. We can, however,

eral aid. The true setting is somewhere
report how state and local governments
between these positions. The state and loin general and cities in particular have
responded to the new economics of cal
thegovernment sector is generally free of

budgetary crises but there are pockets of
1980s and infer from this how they might
fiscal poverty where the consequences of
react in 1987 and beyond.

This paper has five sections. Next the
we tax reform will be difficult to absorb.

consider the context in which the tax re-

form will affect cities, i.e., there are imThe Fiscal Health of the State and Local
Government Sector

It is no simple matter to index the fis-

cal health of the state and local govern-

*Syracuse University.
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2 NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL [Vol. XL
ment sector. The most
used
(and misused)
state and
local governments
(see Table 1).
There has been a positive
generalgeneral
account
measure of fiscal condition
is the
surplus
since the
second quarter of 1983, as
surplus of state and
local
governments

estimated in the National Income Ac-

averaging (at an annual rate) $19.6 bilin 1984 (4.15 percent of total state and
counts (NIA). Despite its flaws, thelion
surgovernment expenditures), $9.0 bilplus measure provides some indirectlocal
evidence about fiscal health.2 It describes
thein 1985 (1.74 percent of expendilion
extent to which current revenues can cover
tures), and $10.3 billion in the first two
total expenditures and contribute to fur- quarters of 1986 (1.9 percent of expendither improvements in public service lev- tures). This surplus position suggests that
els, lower tax rates, and retirement of debt.state and local governments do have a
As a deficit it measures the pressure todiscretionary cushion with which to supreduce public service levels, increase taxes port public service levels and to generally
or borrow.
deal with fiscal problems.
In fact, the size of the surplus in recent We might make two other comments
years indicates a strong fiscal position of about this trend in the growth of the sur-

TABLE 1

GENERAL ACCOUNT SURPLUS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS:
TRENDS AND CYCLICAL SWING

Amount Percent of Total

Year:Quarter (in billions of 1982 dollars) Expenditures
1980:
IV
7.09
1.72
1981
:
IV
3.86
0.95
1982
:
IV
-3.82
-0.92
1983
:
IV
10.40
2.47

1984 : IV 17.21 4.00
1985
:
IV
7.46
1.66
1986:1
13.22
2.92

1986

:

IIa

4.11

0.89

Cyclical Swing Net Accumulation
(in

binions)

(in

billions)

In Current 1982 In Current 1982

1969 : 1 11-1973: IV 5.62 13.24 1.38 0.57
1973: IV -1980:1 8.93 13.99 19.77 24.55

1980:1 -1981:111 6.92 7.52 9.11 9.93
1981 : 1 1 1-1986 : 1 1 10.85 9.61 38.18 34.07

aThe latest data available at the time of this
second quarter of 1986.

SOURCE: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, National

Income and Product Accounts of the United States, 1927-76, and

Survey of Current Business (July 1982, 1983, 1984, 1986 and

February, March and August 1986).

This content downloaded from 131.96.28.155 on Wed, 19 Oct 2022 19:20:33 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

No. 1] URBAN GOVERNMENT FINANCE 3

Because
thenot
NIA areunusually
not disaggregated
plus. First, the amount
is
below the national
we do
not learn
large. The surplus varies
over level,
the
busithese positive surpluses
and accuness cycle, but a levelhow
equivalent
to about
mulations
are local
divided among
the 50 states
2 percent of total state
and
govern-

local governments.
In particment expenditures and
is 30,000
roughly
normal.
ular we do not
learn what
we most
want
Second, there is evidence
that
the
state
to know
- how the
budgetary position
and local government
fiscal
position
hasof

area governments
hasbusifared during
been less affected by urban
swings
in the
the than
most recent
There are,
ness cycle in the 1980s
in expansion.
the 1970s.
however,of
goodcyclical
analyses that swing
go some way
We have calculated a kind
towards
answering
the question. The Buin the general surplus,
i.e.,
the difference

reau of Economic
Analysis
(BEA) periodin the average quarterly
general
surplus

ically
estimates
the division of
the surin a contraction and in
the
following
ex-

plusgreater
among state versus
govpansion (Table 1). The
the local
swing,

ernments;
the National
Conference
the more sensitive the
surplus
to this
par- of

State For
Legislatures
tracks the surplus
ticular business cycle.
example,
the of
state governments;
and Philip
Dearborn
average quarterly surplus
"swung"
from
follows
theabudgetary
position $2.0
of a sama negative $3.6 billion
to
positive
ple of large city governments.3
billion during the 1969-1973
business

these more disaggregated
data we
cycle. If these data areFrom
deflated
and comlearn two important
things
about the
puted across business can
cycles,
we can
reach

changing
fiscal health has
of state
and local
the conclusion that the
surplus
been
governments
duringswings)
the past decade.in
The
less cyclical (smaller
cyclical
the 1980s than in the 1970s. This indifirst is that local governments as a class
cates a more conservative fiscal behavior
have fared better than state governon the part of state and local govern-ments: their surplus has typically been
larger during expansions and their deficit
ments in the 1980s, perhaps a result of
not as large during contractions. This has
painful lessons learned in the 1970s.
Has the business cycle "hurt" state and been due, in the past, to the inflow of
grants and to the relative stability of the
local governments as much in the 1980s
as in the 1970s? We can answer this ques-property tax. The second lesson is that
there has been a very dramatic shift in
tion by taking into account the average
the distribution among states in the size
duration of the business cycle and calcuof balances held. At various times in the
lating "net accumulation," i.e., we must
late 1970s, Texas, Oklahoma, Alaska and
estimate the amount by which the state
California accounted for a substantial
and local government sector recovers its
deficit and accumulates reserves during
proportion of cash balances held by the
the expansion. A larger net accumulation states. By the mid-1980s, the situation had
almost reversed and the large balances
implies that the sector's financial position
was helped more by the recovery than itwere held by northern states while the
farm belt and energy belt states had fallen
was hurt by the recession. This was the

case during the 1973-1980 cycle, whenon harder times.
state and local governments added about
$20 billion more to their surplus during
The Economy
the 19 quarters of expansion than they
drew down during the six quarters of States and cities have also benefited
recession (at annual rates), and it is true
from the performance of the U.S. economy. There has been real growth since
of all four cyclical periods studied here
(Table 1). During the present business 1982 and a low rate of inflation. This has
buoyed up state and local government tax
cycle, state and local governments have
bases and it has kept cost-push pressures
realized an accumulated surplus of more
off the expenditure side of budgets. The
than $30 billion. It is important to note
that this accumulation has occurred in a
latter is particularly beneficial to local
time of federal aid reductions.
governments whose labor-intensive ex-
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first questions
to asksensitive
in sizing up the to
penditures are much
more
presentare
condition
of cities,
then, are
price increases than
its
revenues.
During periods of
whether
high
their inflation,
budgetary position shows
some
urban local governments
signs of stress
have
and howlost
have their
a subeconperformed in the first
half of the
stantial amount of omies
purchasing
power
be-

1980s?
cause their property
tax base was unre-

sponsive to general The
price
growth in
increases.4
income, employment and
The business cycleprices
has
not
been
harsh
is only
one dimension
of as
the chang-

in the 1980s. Two recessions in the 1980s
have not hurt cities as much as did the

ing economy that impacts on city fi-

nances. It is also important to consider the

major economic contraction of the mideffects of discretionary federal policy,
1970s.5 This is partly because the ecoparticularly reductions in federal aid. Annomic base of cities was not hit as hard
other set of potentially significant imin the most recent recessions (except those
pacts relates to changes that are outside

in the industrial Midwest) and partly bethe discretionary control of governments:
cause their expenditure budgets hadthe
be-tax limitation sentiment, the sunbelt
come much leaner in the late 1970s.
shift, and the increasing concentration of

The deficit and the strong dollar have
the poor in urban areas.

been a mixed blessing to the state and lo-

cal government sector. For those areas
Fiscal Health
specializing in manufacturing and com-

The measurement of fiscal health and
peting in international markets, the strong

dollar has meant higher unemployment
distress has always been a hotly debated

and slower growing tax bases; for someissue.
of No matter how scientific the ma-

those areas more dependent upon trade
nipulation of the data, the final conclusion about who is distressed and who is
and international banking and finance,

the opposite has been true. Similarly, the
not is very much dependent on the judg-

Reagan deficits have bestowed special
ment of the analyst doing the work.
blessings on those areas receiving large
Nevertheless, two general approaches to
federal defense outlays.
measuring urban financial health seem
II. The Present Condition of Cities
Much has been made of the relation-

to have held the floor during most of the
past decade. These are the studies of city

budget conditions, and the comparative

statistical studies of fiscal and economic

ship between national economic perfordistress. The question we might raise here

mance and the economic condition of cit-

is how these indicators of fiscal health and

distress - which were read in the 1970s
ies. Some see the issue in terms of the very
straightforward proposition that a rising
to indicate severe financial problems -

tide lifts all boats. Others thinks that some

have tracked during the 1980s.

sectors of the economy do not share ade- Dearborn's most recent results are parquately in national growth and would putticularly interesting because they suggest
central cities in this class. Those who see
that large central cities, even some of those
a poor performance of city economies can
thought to be distressed, have found a way
partially explain their healthier budgetto share in the growing surplus. First, note
ary performance in terms of belt-tightthe makeup of his 30-city sample: 20 lost
ening. It could be argued that the continpopulation between 1971 and 1984, the
ued threat of recession in the 1980s has
population of the entire sample shrank by
forced a fiscal austerity on city fiscal be4 percent, five cities lost more than 20
havior, that lower rates of inflation have
percent of their population and five had
taken some of the pressure off expendia gain of more than 20 percent.
ture budgets and that economic growth has
Dearborn's analysis focuses on the gap
supported the real growth in revenue bases
between general fund revenues and ex-

just enough to avert real problems. The
penditures, liquidity position, and fund
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balances. One clear finding
Nearly all lists ofis
citiesthat
in trouble
large
in the
city budget deficits1970s
are
cyclical,
included
the large cities usually
of the North

and Midwest
and few
southern or westerna
occurring in the (fiscal)
year
following
cities.7

national recession. Thirteen of his 30 cit-

ies ran a deficit in 1976, 19 in 1980, 10 Katherine Bradbury, building on her

in 1981, and 16 in 1983. But in 1984, only
earlier work with colleagues, has at-

six cities showed an operating deficit.
tempted to determine whether the discities of the 1970s have realized
Moreover, he finds the improvement tressed
in
fiscal position to be widespread. General
an improved or worsened position in the
fund balances as a percent of revenues
1980s. She finds that the relative posi-

more than doubled between 1976 and 1984.
These results lead Dearborn to conclude

tion of the distressed cities of the 1970s

has not changed. Her quantitative rankthat large cities were ". . .in perhaps ings
the showed that the "distress position"
best financial condition they had been generally
in
worsened between 1975 and
since 1971, as judged by their success1980
in for cities that had declining populations and smaller shares of their metbalancing budgets and maintaining balance sheet surpluses and liquidity.
ropolitan populations, and for cities loAnother approach to measuring urban
cated in the North. Ladd, Yinger, et al.
condition comes from the "fiscal distress"
also see a worsening of fiscal distress over
studies. In the 1970s there was a flurry
time.9 They find that the expenditure
of research designed more to rank than to
needs-revenue gap of central cities has
measure the fiscal and economic strain on
been increasing over the past two decades, and that the fiscal condition of the
cities. This work was stimulated by the
increased use of federal assistance to suplargest cities is far worse than that of

middle and smaller sized cities. Even
port urban finances in the early 1970s and
the need to find objective indicators of urDearborn's generally optimistic work sug-

ban distress to include in the grant forgests a fiscal disadvantage of northern
cities. He finds continuing fund deficits,
mulae. But perhaps more important, these
studies were an attempt to show that the
low liquidity, and/or severe revenue-exchanging U.S. federalism and the changpenditure balances in New York, Chiing structure of the U.S. economy had left
cago, Philadelphia, Detroit, Boston,
Cleveland, St. Louis and Buffalo. This
some cities with an inability to provide
their citizens with either jobs or an ade-leads him to conclude that cities with
problem balance sheets had a hard time
quate level of public services. Many
thought this was much more than a tem- improving their condition, while those in
porary situation and that long-term fed- a healthy condition continued to improve.
eral intervention would be required.
The comparative approach is focused on
The Economic Base of Urban Areas
urban areas, usually large cities, and atThe 1970s were a rough period for urtempts to measure relative economic, soban economies. For the first time several
cial and fiscal health. The comparison
usually considers more than budgetary metropolitan areas were losing populaposition in trying to get a fix on the bal- tion, urban unemployment rates were up,
ance between resources available to the
and the most rapid population growth was
in nonmetropolitan areas. The problems
local governments and service level
"needs." The specific measurements usedcame to a head with the recession of the
are sometimes flawed and always debat-mid-1970s which had a devastating effect
able, but the intent of most of these stud- on the economies of large central cities,
ies is to identify cities whose populations particularly those in the older industrial
have heavy concentrations of high-cost,region of the country. The precipitous delow-income families. Despite the very greatcline in employment pushed several large
differences in approach, there has beencities, most notably New York, to the edge
substantial consistency in the findings.of fiscal bankruptcy.
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Federal
and State areas
Aid Policy - and
These "declining"
urban

there were a great many of them - did not
Another event of major importance to
keep up with the rest of the nation in the
cities in the late 1970s and early 1980s
economic recovery of the last half of the

a substantial
slowing ofcities
the growth en1970s. As a result,was
many
large
in federal grants to state and local govtered the 1980s in a quite different way
ernments. Since the beginning of the
than they had entered the 1970s: their per
slowdown in about 1978, real federal
capita income advantage over the rest of
grants
havedisappeared,
fallen from $49.4 billiontheir
to
the nation had fallen
or
an estimated $37.7 billion in 1987, and
national employment and population
from 3.7 percent of GNP to 2.2 percent.
shares were greatly diminished, and they

were looking at the prospects of more decline as the recession of 1980 set in.

The result of this decline is that state and

local governments have become much less

Since fiscal collapse never came, onedependent on federal aid: from 31.7 percent of own source revenues in 1978, fedquestion to answer is what has happened
eral assistance will drop to an estimated
in the 1980s? Did continued economic de19.5 percent in 1987.
cline materialize and how did it affect the
budgetary position and fiscal choices of Even more important, the big urban aid

urban governments? We cannot survey allprograms - CETA, ARFA, and Local
cities, and moreover it is well known thatPublic Works - were disappearing in the
early 1980s. As may be seen in Table 3,
employment and personal income data are

big cities had become greatly dependent
not available below the county level. Weon
federal assistance in the 1970s. For excan however, report the results of an
ample,
St. Louis, Buffalo, Chicago, Balanalysis of the economic performance of
U.S. counties and regions in the 1980s, andtimore and Detroit among this group all

received $40 or more in direct federal aid
then turn to our own analysis of large citfor every dollar raised from own sources.
ies.
On average, the reliance on federal aid in
Daniel Garnick's studies of BEA emthe 15 large cities dropped from one-third
ployment data give a good account of
the
to about one-fifth of total local revenues
transition from the 1970s to the 1980s.10
inthat
seven years. The drop was especially
His results, described in Table 2, show
severe in the early 1980s - a reduction of
employment in metropolitan core coun$23 per capita in real terms between 1982

ties grew at a rate well below the naand 1984. For certain cities, and partictional average between 1969 and 1979.11
ularly some of those in the declining reThis pattern was true in slowly growing
gions, the losses were very great. The
Mideast, Plains and Great Lakes regions,

question
to be asked is whether, and how,
and core county employment actually
dethese
revenue
losses were replaced.
clined in the Mideast. The first part of the
1980s - plagued by two recessions - Not
hasonly has federal aid fallen off, but

state assistance to local governments has
shown a slower overall national employalsoan
declined. The U.S. Treasury reports
ment growth than in the 1970s and

even slower growth in core counties.that
Theper capita real state aid to local governments peaked in 1979 and in 1983 was
lagging employment growth in central

counties holds for the Mideast, forlower
the than at any time since 1974.12 In
1975, cities received $42 in state aid for
Plains and Great Lakes regions where
employment has declined. Core counties every $100 of own source revenues. By
in the Mideast region have done better in 1984, this ratio had dropped to $29.

the 1980s than in the 1970s, but they have
not done well. The story is quite different,
Other Changes in the Economy
however, in New England and in the sunbelt where the employment increase in
There were other important changes in
core counties has exceeded that in the rest
the U.S. economy that might help explain
of the nation.
the performance of cities in the 1980s. One
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TABLE 2
EMPLOYMENT GROWTH BY REGION AND COUNTY TYPE:
FOR SELECTED YEARS

(average annual percent increase)
1969-79 1979-84
US

Total
2.16
1.38
MSA Core Counties 1.26 1.08
Mideast

Total
0.68
1.08
MSA Core Counties -0.96 0.25
Great Lakes

Total 1.36 -0.38
MSA Core Counties 0.37 -0.87

New England

Total
1.62
2.06
MSA Core Counties 1.88 2.71

Plains

Total
2.10
0.61
MSA Core Counties 1.04 -0.13
Southeast

Total
2.70
1.86
MSA Core Counties 2.93 2.87
Southwest

Total
3.71
3.04
MSA Core Counties 4.68 3.62

Rocky Mountains

Total
4.41
2.16
MSA Core Counties 2.36 1.44

Far West

Total
3.36
1.97
MSA Core Counties 2.95 2.04

SOURCE: Computed from unpublished
employment data and reported in Daniel
Garnick, "Local Area Economic Growth
Patterns: A Comparison of the 1980s
and Previous Decades," paper prepared
for the National Academy of Sciences,
July 1986.
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TABLE 3

DIRECT FEDERAL AID AS A PERCENTAGE OF OW
GENERAL REVENUE: SELECTED CITIES AN
FISCAL YEARS

Per Capita Real

Fiscal Years, Percentage Federal Aid

St. Louis 1.0 27.5 40.6 24.5 22.9 $192 $155 $159

Newark 1.7 31.9 17.9 10.6 35.2 214 44 99
Buffalo 2.1 87.6 54.6 75.3 34.4 486 326 162
Cleveland 8.3 56.9 25.3 41.3 28.4 245 187 123
Boston 10.0 21.4 14.5 15.9 19.8 300 151 158

Unweighted Averages 4.6 45.1 30.6 33.5 28.1 287 172 140

Baltimore 3.8 45.5 45.1 23.8 17.6 331 160 129

Philadelphia 8.8 30.1 16.1 22.3 13.3 220 156 104

Detroit 13.1 46.7 85.6 58.3 23.5 267 337 119

Chicago 10.9 30.2 44.8 40.2 32.3 122 153 130

Atlanta 2.0 13.9 20.7 11.8 15.9 78 94 126

Unweighted Averages 7.7 33.3 42.4 31.3 20.5 204 180 121

Denver 1.2 21.1 16.8 13.4 8.8 155 117 87

Los Angeles 0.7 24.3 21.1 16.3 13.8 105 78 72

Dallas 0.0 15.8 15.5 13.3 9.4 61 56 50
Houston 3.1 14.4 16.9 16.0 8.4 48 71 46
Phoenix 10.6 37.9 33.6 27.1 22.3 92 95 93

Unweighted Averages 3.1 22.7 20.8 17.2 12.5 92 83 70

Unweighted Averages of
15 Cities 5.2 33.7 31.3 27.3 20.4 $194 $145 $110

aBased on 1980 population figures.

^In 1982 dollars.

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Ce

Finances in 1966-67, 1976-77, 1980-81, 1981-82, 1

important possibility, it Mideast
is alleged,
is as
that
has not done
badly as during

the economic shifts to the sunbelt that so
dominated the 1970s are over. The data

the past decade. Journalists and politicians who have been pleased to announce
presented in Table 2 do not support this
the turnaround in the relative growth of
argument. The Mideast and Plains reregions have simply called it wrong.

gions are growing, but below the national

Another major factor affecting state and

average; the Great Lakes region is in de- local government budgets in the 1980s is
cline, and the Southeast, Southwest and the aftermath of the tax limitation move-

Far West continue to grow faster than the ment. There have not been a succession

rest of the nation. The big change from of Proposition 13 and 2 1/2 programs in

the 1970s is the rapid growth of the New the 1980s, but the message of the limi-

England region, and the fact that the tation movement does not seem to have
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No. 1] URBAN GOVERNMENT FINANCE 9
and reduced
shifts from one
been lost. In 1978, state
andborrowing
local and
government taxes stood at 12.75
type of expenditure
percent
to another.
of perThe one
sonal income and by 1984
response in
itwhich
had
we are
dropped
most interested,
to 11.71 percent. This changes
recognition
in the quality of
of
public
voter
services,
sentiment against higher
is not directly
taxes
measurable,
has but
probwe may get
some idea from
these other
indicators.
ably been a major reason
for
the
more
conservative fiscal policies of the 1980s

and it may explain some of the strength
State and Local Government Responses
in budgetary position that cities and states

have shown.
Some have raised the issue of the ef-

As was described above, state and local

governments have reacted to the economfects of the changing population structure
ics of the 1980s by building up a general
on city finances. The increasing concenaccount surplus. Apparently this was done
tration of the elderly is pretty well docby some combination of increasing tax
umented, but their impact on city budgets
rates and slowing the rate of growth in
is not easily sorted out. On the other hand,
expenditures. To better understand the
the elderly pump a good deal of moneynature
into of the fiscal response, the tax, exthe economy - witness the increasing share
penditure and borrowing patterns of the

of transfer payments in personal in1970s and the 1980s are compared in the

come - but they are not easily reached
bypanel of Table 4. A first finding is that
top
local property taxes. It does seem true while
that the rate of increase in real personal
income
it costs more to supply certain services
to and real federal aid fell off in the
1980s,
the aged, but much of this is supported
by the rate of increase in taxes went

federal assistance. The net effect on local

up in real dollar terms. Compared to the

entire decade of the 1970s, state and local
budgets, and how this has affected and will
affect the performance of the city fise ingovernments in aggregate did not cut taxes
the 1980s, is simply unclear.
in the 1980s. This finding squares with
Finally, there is urban poverty; not only
Gold's report that there were unprecea concentration of the poor in central citdented state government tax increases in
ies, but an increase in this concentration.the aftermath of the recessions of the early
John Kasarda notes that minority popu1980s. The very rapid growth in the genlation in central cities in the Northeast

eral account surplus during 1983 is ex-

grew from 33 percent in 1975 to 41 perplained by these fiscal actions. On the excent in 1985 (28 to 36 percent in the Midpenditure side, state and local governments have held the line in the 1980s.
west) and that the central city poverty rate
the real increase in current gengrew from 12 percent in 1960 to nearlyWhereas
20
eral expenditures of state and local govpercent by 1983. 13 There has been a proernments was about 3.7 percent per year
nounced growth in the number of house-

holds headed by black females - prime
in the 1970s, it was 2.5 percent per year

1980 and 1984. Retrenchment on
candidates for continued poverty - andbetween
64
percent of such households now live the
in capital outlay side was even more severe. The story, then, would seem to be
central cities. The growth in this concenthat taxes were increased to compensate
tration of the poor seems incongruous with
the budgetary health reported above. for the loss in external aid and to protect
current expenditures. In particular, state

and local governments have followed a
course of reducing their public employment levels during 1980-1982 and allowHow have urban governments responded to the changing economy and theing relatively small increases since 1982.
At the same time they have increased the
retrenchment in federal aid in the early
1980s? The possibilities include reduc-average rate of compensation of their emIII. Fiscal Responses in the 1980s

tions in the size of the public workforce,ployees both in real terms and relative to
the private sector.14
and in the rate of public employee compensation, increased or decreased tax rates, We can also investigate the response of
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TABLE 4

CHANGES IN SELECTED FISCAL INDICATORS:
1970-1984

(average annual percent changes)
In Current Dollars In 1982 Dollars
1970-80 1980-84 1970-80 1980-84
All State and Local Governments

Personal Income 10.56 8.33 2.28 1.90
Federal Aid 14.28 3.98 5.73 - 2.19

Taxes

9.92

Direct Expenditures:

Capital

Other:

7.81

9.41

2.99

12.05

Current

1.69

-0.26

9.34

12.14

8.93

2.92

-

3.67

3.74

3.13

2.86
2.47

Assistance and Subsidies 6.53 6.65 - 1.45 0.32
Interest on General Debt 13.14 18.27 4.67 11.25
Insurance Benefits and

Repayment 14.75 8.91 6.17 2.44
All Municipalities:
Personal

Income 10.56 8.33 2.28 1.90
Federal Aid 23.32 - 1.01 14.09 - 6.88
Taxes
8.64
8.75
0.51
2.30

Direct Expenditures:

Capital
Other:

8.65

3.67

10.95

0.52

9.11

-

2.64

2.48

2.64

Current 11.28 8.44 2.96 2.00
Assistance and Subsidies 2.19 6.04 - 5.46 - 0.25
Interest on General Debt 10.46 17.96 2.19 10.96
Insurance Benefits and

Repayment 11.56 11.41 3.21 4.80
SOURCE: Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Governmental Finances

in 1983-84, 1969-70, 1979-80; and City Governmental Finances in
1983-84, T969-70, 1979-80, Bureau of Economic Analysis, Regional

Economic Measurement Division, Personal Income by States "and
Regions, August 1986.

all municipal governments in the U.S. As

may be seen from Table 4, the story is

much the same. Taxes were increased in

Large City Government Responses
What has been the response of the largest cities in the U.S. to the new economics

the 1980s to compensate for aid reducof the 1980s? What have they done diftions, but there was a substantial slowing
ferently from the 1970s that explains
in the rate of growth in expenditures. Dearborn's
As
findings of a relatively sound

in the case of all state and local governbudgetary position? We have studied the
fiscal response of overlapping local govments, municipalities cut their employernments in the 27 largest Metropolitan
ment levels in the early 1980s.
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TABLE 5
ABSOLUTE CHANGES IN SELECTED FISCAL VARIABLES:
UNWEIGHTED AVERAGES FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

IN 27 METROPOLITAN AREAS3

1970-75 1975-79 1979-81 1981-83 1979-83 1970-83

Real Per Capi ta
Taxes 10.17 -7.21 -15.94 10.59 - 5.35 - 2.39

Expenditures 81.32 5.15 -15.57 - 6.17 -21.75 64.72
Expenditures Excluding Public

Welfare 78.87 11.97 -13.00 - 4.77 -17.77 73.07

Employment Per 1000 Population 4.54 1.16 - 2.33 - 1.15 - 3.49 2.21
Debt Per $1000 Personal Income - 1.38 -22.27 - 2.26 5.71 3.45 -20.19

Real Per Capita Debt Outstanding 10.75 -40.71 -26.92 18.46 - 8.46 -38.42
Real Per Capita:

State Aid 43.06 6.89 - 3.91 - 9.84 -13.75 36.20
Federal Aid 31.58 23.77 - 8.71 -12.15 -20.86 34.49

aThe 27 MSAs are listed in Table 6.
^Deflated amounts are in 1972 dollars.
SOURCE: Department of Cormierce, Bureau of the Census,

Metropolitan Areas and Large Counties: 1969-70, 19

Local Government Employment in Selected Metropolit
1975, 19/9, 1981, 1983; Current Population Reports, Series P-Z5, No. 739, November

1976, No. 873, February 1980, No. 957, October 1984, Series P-26, No. 82-1-SC.
September 1984, No. 65-52-C, October 1984, No. 78-4, August 1979, Bureau of Economic
Analysis, Survey of Current Business, April 1985, 1983, June 1978; Local Area
Personal Income: 1970-75, August 1977.

Statistical Areas (MSAs) and can give
in borrowing. These resources funded a
some explanation of the response. The substantial increase in expenditures and
picture is one of a dramatic retrenchan expansion in public employment. Durment.
ing the last half of the decade, the real
We consider three time periods in Table increase in per capita aids fell, taxes de5: 1970-1975, a period of fiscal expan- clined in real terms, and borrowing was
sion; 1975-1979, the aftermath of the
negative. Real expenditures increased very
recession, a long economic recovery, and little and public employment growths
the beginning of the tax limitation move- slowed dramatically. The modest real inment; and 1979-1983, a period of two short creases in expenditures that took place in
recessions, the Reagan policy years and a the last half of the decade, as well as the
period of economic expansion. On the rev- tax reductions, were financed by real in-

enue side between 1970 and 1975, these creases in federal and state aid.
When the real increments in federal and
data show real per capita increases in
taxes and aid of over $84 and another $10 state aid turned negative in 1979-1983,
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TABUE 6

ABSOLUTE CHANGES IN SELECTED FISCAL VARIABLES: OVERLAPPING
LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN 27 METROPOLITAN AREAS

Federal

Federal

Federal

City Taxes Aid Expenditures Taxes Aid Expenditures Taxes Aid Expenditures
Baltimore -11.21 36.51 102.58 -4.61 28.57 -100.22 -1.02 -40.65 -11.23
Cleveland -20.06 28.04 81.63 -1.81 37.24 55.36 9.98 -18.32 -9.60

Chicago 14.37 15.60 91.15 -15.04 31.80 -13.30 24.89 -1.42 -18.34
Detroit -58.66 37.30 99.26 74.47 25.97 31.78 27.41 -13.07 -21.43

Milwaukee -13.07 28.48 51.97 -27.05 10.08 28.07 16.79 -10.82 4.90
MinneapolisSt. Paul 24.29 42.41 92.99 2.62 23.59 -44.34 -14.49 -31.77 6.08

Philadelphia, 8.81 27.37 69.92 24.40 4.51 21.37 -19.45 10.27 -23.62

Dallas 31.03 15.25 88.15 4.58 13.33 27.84 -6.35 -14.98 -3.92
Denver 10.23 23.80 141.48 43.45 12.15 8.65 -22.45 -27.99 -46.52
Atlanta 54.50 53.26 93.23 -8.86 61.69 20.02 -6.45 -72.06 -52.41
Boston 48.27 24.11 105.46 -7.36 52.44 49.84 -94.89 -12.25 -118.43

Washington 22.33 90.77 147.93 49.22 22.88 -7.05 14.48 -66.33 -55.06
Pittsburgh -13.39 18.53 38.64 14.47 7.40 100.30 23.76 19.00 -15.30

Seattle 32.58 20.60 10.76 -19.37 40.67 6.89 -34.82 -39.26 -47.59
Miani 0.29 14.82 99.87 32.73 32.41 75.16 -10.23 16.73 -39.95
Houston 17.08 21.37 54.23 45,54 5.04 126.63 3.27 -5.20 32.30

Indianapolis -3.16 26.26 80.15 -44.33 19.91 -12.53 -11.74 -22.52 -2.43
Los Angeles 7.21 25.97 54.21 -146.69 25.61 -50.53 -8.39 -21.33 -25.82
Memphis 19.42 38.06 95.43 -10.59 9.82 -27.51 -2.78 8.96 6.83

San Francisco 7.87 42.60 34.06 -165.20 1.47 -51.67 -4.19 -25.21 -22.05

Tampa -20.16 27.00 56.84 18.83 41.51 63.02 -7.91 -47.58 -68.25
Honolulu -15.91 36.95 14.33 -2.01 39.04 -27.55 -0.02 -48.46 -16.21

New Orleans 6.31 33.37 36.83 19.30 27.03 19.43 31.99 -21.95 40.26
New York 74.61 44.05 234.77 -8.15 15.42 -256.66 17.31 -9.77 -14.39
Phoenix 12.91 26.12 103.85 27.93 15.29 62.51 -76.34 -19.90 -62.92

San Antonio 12.71 29.50 86.73 -1.32 21.46 35.70 2.60 -23.50 15.42

San Diego 25.51 24.68 29.15 -89.94 15.38 -2.17 4.46 -23.73 -17.48
Unweighted

Average 10.17 31.58 81.32 -7.21 23.77 5.15 -5.35 -20.86 -21.75

SOURCE: Department of Cofimerce, Bureau of the Census, Local Government Finances i

Areas and Large Counties: 1969-70, 1974-75, 1978-79, 1980-81, 1982-83.

ban first
areas in
urban governments responded
bythis fiscal response, as is
scribed
in Table 6. However, the gen
cutting real taxes and borrowing
during
conclusion
seems to hold for most place
1979-1981 and then by increasing
taxes
Local governments
in 21 of these 27
and borrowing during 1981-1983.
Neverban seen
areasreal
reduced real per capita exp
theless, the 1980s to date have

ditures
the 1980s, real per capita ta
per capita expenditure reductions
andin
cuts

were cut
in 16, and there were real
in local government employment
per
reductions
in federal aid in 2
10,000 residents. The fiscal capita
strength
of
is notable
that only one of the six urb
local governments in the 1980s
was alareas thatreducdid not cut real per capita
most certainly achieved through
tions in public service levels. spending (Milwaukee) is in the industrial
region.
There is, of course, variation
across ur-
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IV. The Tax Reform

tax price. Gramlich's analysis suggests
that it may be small,16 Kenyon17 and
Given this setting and the current conInman18 find a response of state income
dition of cities, we might speculate about
but not sales taxes, and Feldstein and
the impact of the federal tax reform
on
Metcalf 19 estimate a positive response from

the fiscal condition of cities. If the price
combined personal taxes on income, conof state and local governments rises, will
sumption and property values. Let us
the net response be the same as it has been
suppose, as seems reasonable, that the
to reductions in federal aid - expenditure
longer run growth in states sales and in-

retrenchment? In fact, the most imporcome taxes will be less than it would have

tant long-run impacts may come frombeen
the if the marginal tax rate had not been

heightened fiscal competition between
lowered.
states and between city and suburbanWith a slower growth in taxes, it is

areas, and from the effects of the new tax
likely that the revenue pool available from
code on investment in the housing, manwhich to draw state aid to local governufacturing and services sector. We might
ments will be smaller in the future than
turn, then, to a review of these potential
it would otherwise have been. Note that

effects.

It needs to be emphasized that not all

state aid to local governments in 1982 and

1983 did not increase even though there

metropolitan cities will be affected in the

were substantial increases in state taxes

is concerned with the problems that will
face core cities located in jurisdictionally

in those years. A continuation of this pattern would suggest a smaller real pool of
state aid for distribution to local govern-

same way. Much of the discussion below

fragmented metropolitan areas. Though

there are important exceptions, this tends
to be more of a problem in the older ur-

ments.

The other half of this story is that the
competition for this aid will be more keen.
ban areas in the Northeast and the inSuburban residents, who have higher industrial Midwest. The newer cities in the
comes and are more likely to itemize, will
South and West, again with some notable
lose some of the subsidy to their property

exceptions, have managed to avoid the
tax bill and could well look to the state
major city-suburb wealth and fiscal discapital for relief in the form of increased
parities that have grown up in the North.
school aid. Their pressures will be increased by the stiffened resistance of the

City -Suburban Competition

industrial tax base to increases in the

property tax. Such proposals are not likely
to fall on deaf ears in suburban-domiAn early consequence of the tax reform
may be increased city-suburb competition
nated state legislatures, particularly in
for a smaller pool of state grant money.
states where effective property tax rates

This will come about because of a slower

have reached high levels. Central cities,
growth in state tax revenues and anwhose
in- residents do not suffer as much directly from the loss of deductibility, may
crease in the relative price of suburban

not fare well in such competition.
property taxes. The reduction in the federal marginal tax rate will raise the priceThere is another important dimension

the city-suburb competition that will
of state and local government taxes to
for

those who itemize deductions. Voters will

result from the new tax reform. Many city

react to this by demanding lower state
residents, itemizers who use private
schools, may now be tilted in the directaxes than they otherwise would have detion of suburbs where tax rates are no
manded, but we do not know how much
higher but where they see public educaless they will want or which taxes they
will most object to.

tion services as adequate. If state aids are

Research in this subject does not give
adjusted to increase the subsidy to subus a clear answer to the question of what
urban property tax financing of local

schools, this type of metropolitan decenmight be the response to a change in the

This content downloaded from 131.96.28.155 on Wed, 19 Oct 2022 19:20:33 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms

14 NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL [Vol. XL
tralization will be encouraged.
There
has those
Big city governments,
especially
been little hard research
on may
this
a
in the North,
not issue,
gain from competnotable exception being
Gramlich's
work
itive industrial
policies, even
if they work.
which implies that even
full
elimination
Lower taxes
mean
less direct state spendof deductibility would
give
a also
modest
ing
in localonly
areas and
may mean less
incentive for higher income
to
state aid forresidents
urban programs.
Moreover,
leave the central city.20
the tax structure changes implied for such

an economic development program will

tend to reduce the progressivity of the tax
Interstate Competition

system, and perhaps shift financing re-

The combination of lower
marginal
tax
sponsibility
toward the now
higher-priced
rates, elimination of sales
tax
sales tax.2
On deductibilthe expenditure side, ecoity and the cap on tax-exempt
borrowing
nomic development
programs can stimufor private purposes -late
together
thecore area
job growth andwith
may improve
continued decline in federal
aid
will
economies.
On-the
otherforce
hand, central city

state and local governments
to an
even
areas are still losing
jobs and
appear to
greater reliance on their
own resources.
be less competitive
and therefore unlikely

Much of the subsidy that
softened
into sharehas
fully in
any job growth
that reterstate tax differences
gone,
andpolicy.
sults will
from a be
successful
industrial

more than ever before,
state
local
Moreover,
it has and
been learned
in recent

governments will compete
jobs
using
years thatfor
even low
paying
service sector

fiscal incentives.

jobs are not a good match for the lowest
To the extent that economic develop- income unemployed in central cities.

ment objectives will drive state fiscal pol-

icies even more than they presently do,

central cities may suffer since such poli-

City Government Revenues

cies will not be pro-poor. Tax incentives In some cities there will have to be an

to attract industry will likely be focused immediate revenue windfall adjustment
on company tax holidays or reduced taxif taxpayers are not to face increased lorates, industrial and commercial property cal tax liabilities. This is because local

tax forgiveness, or a reduction in the governments in several of the 14 states

higher marginal personal income tax rates. that permit local income taxes are someThere will be a substantial amount of
how tied to the federal tax base. Given the

pressure on state and local governments
recent behavior of large urban govern-

ments - to reduce real tax rates even in
to reduce business taxes, to partially make
the face of federal and state aid cuts - the
up for the federal tax increases on certain
types of businesses. The resulting revelikely short-run response will be revenue
nue reductions must be made up, either
reduction. In 26 states, local government
by reduced public services or by increases
sales tax burdens on taxpayers will also
rise because of the elimination of deductin other taxes. It is even possible that

competition will pressure a shift in state
ibility. It is less likely that local area resand local government financing responidents will get any relief in the short run,
sibility from the business sector to indibecause of the relatively small magnividuals.
tude of some sales taxes and because the

On the expenditure side the story issales tax tends to be invisible to local tax-

much the same. Industrial subsidies to

payers.

attract plant location and general im-In the long run, the tax reform will
provements in infrastructure will be leadprobably lead to a dampening of the
ing candidates for inclusion in a state
or
growth
in city government revenues. There
local government's industrial policy. are
Ed-two considerations that lead us to this

ucation services may also play a role, likely
conclusion. The first is simply the higher
in the direction of improving technical
price of sales, income and property taxes.
The second is that the tax reform will retraining or improving the general education system in the state or the area. move the subsidy to higher income hous-
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in g costs, reduce the
liefdemand
- since bottom-end
fortaxpayers
homedo not

itemize
butgrowth
would benefit from
rate
ownership and depress
the
in the
the
value of real estate. This
will
dampen
the popureduction
- but
the large poverty
lation
in thebase.22
cities is outside the tax base
growth in the property
tax

and would be untouched. Cities actually

might be hurt by such a program in anPoliticians , Windfalls and the Long Run

other way: if middle income suburban

The first adjustments
residents,
to the
typically
federal
itemizers,
tax
are burreform will come when states deal with
dened most by the tax reform (if they have

the revenue windfall from the expanded
taxable income expansions that are not

federal income tax base. The initial re-

offset by rate reductions) they might bring
action from virtually every statehouse even
has greater pressures on state legislabeen to guarantee returning the windfall
tures to relieve property tax burdens with

increased state aid.
to the taxpayers. A decade ago the reacOther ways to return the windfall are

tion would have been to view these as dis-

cretionary funds with which to address thebeing considered. Reduction in sales taxes
most pressing urban fiscal problems. The is one possibility and could well be more
spirit of the tax revolt movement is still redistributive than income tax relief. This
present, however, and virtually everymay now be a less favored alternative with
governor must deal with taxpayer watch-sales tax deductibility gone. States could
dogs who are demanding state tax relief. decide to spend some of the windfall, to
The demands will be accentuated because
support expanded urban aid programs and/
of the increase in social security taxes. or new state initiatives to deal with the

Three important issues face the states
problems of the urban poor (e.g., workforce), or even to reduce future drains on
in dealing with this windfall issue, and
all have important potential implicationsstate tax revenues by retiring outstand-

for cities. The first is simply the estimaing short-term debt. None of
tion of the size of the revenue gain to be
ing options seem likely since
returned. This estimate requires some asgo against the fiscal grain
1980s - reductions in federal
sumptions about how taxpayers will react

these spendthey would

of the midsubsidy have

to the new law; for examples, will there
been accompanied by reductions in exbe substantial taking of capital gains penditures
at
and public employment.
the end of 1986, will rental housing andThe third issue involves the possible
nonresidential construction begin to drydifferences between the long-run and

short-run consequences of the tax reform.
up and by how much, how will consumption patterns react to the removal of deIt is pretty clear that next year will see a
revenue windfall in income tax states, but
ductibility for sales taxes and credit card
the reforms undertaken could well reduce
interest, etc.? There will be much debate
the long-run elasticity of the state income
about the magnitude and timing of these

impacts: politicians will likely push for
tax. Indeed, reductions of the rate promaking the assumptions that give maxigressivity of state systems has been the

mum tax relief and state officials will

pattern in recent years. This would imply

less to
automatic responsiveness in state tax
probably underestimate the impacts
revenues
counter this. Too great a return to
tax- to future growth in income and
payers could reduce the real value ofmore
the than ever would tie the growth in
pool of funds available for state assisstate spending to the growth in state personal income.
tance to local governments - the recent
past has shown state aid to be sensitive
to the rate of growth in tax revenues.
Effects on Poor People

The second issue is the way in which

the windfall will be returned. The most

As noted above, the urban poor are not
affected by the federal tax reform
common suggestions are relief at the directly
botsince they are not in the income taxpaytom and the top of the income scale. City
residents will benefit some from this reing population. They receive no increased
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take-home pay as a
ofconstruction
the lower
tiveresult
price of physical
(in-

federal rates and they
more
cludingwould
housing) will pay
rise underno
the reform
if their state governments
the
windand the mobilitykept
of firms and
people
might

fall. In fact, the urban
poorthese
would
fare
be slowed. Whether
impacts would

better if the windfall
were
on hube great
enough spent
to make a difference
is

man capital development
in inner cities.
another question.
The events of the past
seem
The other decade
way to look at the
impact ofto

make it clear that those
living
in
poverty
the tax reform
is that the
relative
profare not likely to share
the employment
itabilityin
of investments
in the service sec-

tor will increase.
Most cities economic
have realbenefits of a stronger
national
ized a substantial portion of their
employment growth in this sector in retax reform will have important indirect
cent years. Even so, it is not clear that
effects on the urban poor. We can but
increased jobs in the service sector will
speculate about these. The long-run inimprove the lot of the lowest income rescome elasticity of the reformed federal idents
inin the central city. Indeed, some
come tax will be lower, perhaps suggesthave argued that service jobs do not "fit"
ing even greater federal aid cuts in the
the urban poorest, and may even exacfuture. On the other hand, a more rapid
erbate the unemployment problem.23
national economic growth could have just A second favorable effect on local govthe opposite effect, even with a lower inernments is that in raising the price of
come tax elasticity. State aid to central
taxes, the reform should encourage govcity governments and state direct expenernment efficiency. Public officials will

growth.
The other side of the coin is that the

have to be more accountable for their use
ditures on pro-poor services could be lower
than they otherwise would have been beof higher priced local taxes. As a result,
cause of interstate and interlocal fiscal
one can expect to see more innovative apcompetition. Depending on how investors
proaches to service delivery as cities search
react, there will be less rental housing
for less costly ways to do business. More

construction and a drift toward higher
privatization and contracting out, and a
rents. It is not clear, however, that much
low heavier use of benefit charges are

income families will face higher rents.certain to play a more prominent role in
The setting is important. These imcity finances.
pacts of tax reform come at a time when
federal aid is being cut and when jobs are
V. Conclusions
not growing in the inner city areas.
The federal income tax reform is a

Effect on City Economies

strong step in the right direction for U.S.

economic policy. It focuses on economic

There is, potentially, a brighter side efficiency
to
at a time when there is need for
the story as regards the impact of the the
tax U.S. economy to be more productive,
reform on central city economies. At least
it cleans up a host of complexities in a tax
there is a brighter side for certain types
code that badly needed cleaning up and it
of cities. The new code removes an intakes a great amount of unfairness out of
vestment subsidy that has benefited
the system. But it has side effects. These
manufacturers who make heavy invest- might be acceptable as a necessary cost of
ment in plant and equipment. Replacing reforming the system, but they ought to
this with a generally lower corporate tax be explicitly recognized.

rate is bad news for cities that still rely One such side effect is changes in the
heavily on a manufacturing base. One nature of American federalism. The new
could argue that the new code will fur- tax code gives another push to reducing
ther shake the already weak competitive the state and local government role in
position of many goods-producing firms. taxing and spending. Real reductions in
The removal of the tax subsidy from man- federal aid, competition among the states
ufacturing has a brighter side. The rela- and the lingering sentiments of the tax
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limitation movement should ensure this

enues: Methods and Case Studies," Public Finance

Quarterly , Vol. 5, No. 7 (1977), p. 275.
a discussion of the performance of central cittion, greater pressures to hold the line on
ies vs. suburbs in the business cycles of the past two
property taxes and reduced state aid willdecades, see George Peterson, "Urban Policy and the
Cyclical Behavior of Cities," in George Patterson and
probably govern the growth in local ex-

outcome. Likewise, interlocal competi- 5For

Carol Lewis, eds., Reagan and the Cities (Washing-

penditure budgets and the trend of fiscalton, DC: Urban Institute, 1986), pp. 11-36.

centralization to the state government

level will continue.
The other side effect has to do with cit-

6Dearborn, "Fiscal Conditions in Large American

Cities," p. 36.
7For a review of this literature, see Roy Bahl, Financing State and Local Government in the 1980s.

ies - especially the larger, older cities of

8Katherine L. Bradbury, "Urban Decline and Dis-

the North whose economies are declining tress: An Update," New England Economic Review
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